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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Financial leverage is am integral part of financial
memagement and has some degree of influence, either directly
or indirectly, upon nearly amy financial decision facing a
firm.

Because of this importamt role, effective mensuration

of and accurate effectual relations relevant to financial
leverage must be developed.
This paper offers a first step toward these objectives,
Chapter 2 deals with different measures that have been sug
gested for leverage and Chapter 3 concerns itself with
theories about the effect of leverage on the cost of
capital.
The discussions regarding both leverage measurements
and cost of capital theories will be directed toward the
objective of this paper:

comparison between views.

A firm may be said to be levered vdien there are
securities of ownership outstanding, which have different
priorities of payment, and where smoe of the promised
payments for the use of funds are of limited amount
(so that if more than the limited amount is earned the
holder of a different type of security benefits).

(London:

^Harold Bierman, Jr., Financial Policy Decisions
The Macmillan Company, ig70), p. 07.
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Or more simply,
Leverage may be defined as the employment of an asset
or funds for which the firm pays a fixed cost or
fixed return.
The case of farmer Jones represents a simple analogy
exercising the underlying principles of financial leverage.
If farmer Jones needs another horse and can get more work
out of his neighbor Joe's horse than Joe can, both of them
may be able to benefit.

For example, if Joe can only make

Trigger plow 50 acres a day and farmer Jones can get him
to trum under 60, it would be possible for neighbor Joe to
rent Trigger to farmer Jones at a set charge equal to the
profits of 55 acres a day, giving both of them an extra
5 acres profit.
Prom farmer Jones point of view, leverage would
be the employment of Trigger for a fixed cost of 55 acres
profit a day.

As long as Trigger kept up the good work and

plowed more than 55 acres a day the leverage would be called
positive; below 55, however, it would be negative and farmer
Jones had better hope that Joe is a friendly neighbor.

The

latter situation points out one of the main dangers of using
leverage; althou^ there is a chance of esuming more throu^
the utilization of leverage there also exists the chance of
being worse off if the return on borrowed funds does not
exceed the fixed charges for their use.
^James C. VanHome, Financial Management and Policy
(Sog^ewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 196b;, p. 547
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Chapter 2
LEVERAGE MEASUREMENT
Whether or not a firm is leveraged is not the most
important aspect of financial leverage, rather it is the
effects upon the firm caused by leverage.

Before any such

effects can be dealt with, however, leverage must be quanti
fied.

This is not a simple task as will be made apparent

in this chapter.
PROBLÎMS AND OBJECTIVES
There have been many different approaches sug
gested for measuring leverage but none has been proven
fully superior and up to the task of providing an adequate
measurement of leverage for all situations.

Appendix 1

contains a list of 27 formulas which have been used by
financial writers to measure leverage.

The reason for this

diversity is the complexity of the object measured aind the
lack of a posited definition for it.

Since a definition is

closely related to the defining equation it m i ^ t be said
that there are at least 27 definitions of leverage.

These

variations are made possible by numerous factors affecting
leverage measurements such as taxes and whether the figures
are based on book or market values, as well as the use of
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definitions designed to measure specific aspects of
leverage or viewpoints of the measurer.

Such a situation

exists because no single measure of leverage, in a realistic
or practical sense, can measure all aspects associated with
leverage.

Still such a definition of leverage, as demonstrated

on pages 1 and 2, is possible if it can be made general e n o u ^
to apply to most situations.

By their very nature, however,

such definitions prove of little or no use in the detailed
objective world of actual physical mensuration.
As a result what is needed is either, (1) a workable
leverage measure applicable in all situations, which seems
impossible at this time, (2) a proven leverage measure for
each different and definable circumstance demanding one, or
(3) some knowledge of the interrelationships between measures
so that consistencies and inconsistencies can be identified.
The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss suggested
leverage equations and several studies that have been applied
to problems of their usage in an attempt to decide upon the
best means of developing an acceptable and consistent lever
age measurement system represented by one of the three courses
of action just stated.
STUDIES CONDUCTED & MEASURES SUGGESTED
The most basic measure of financial leverage is a
simple ratio of debt (D) to equity or common stock (S):
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The higher the value of

the higher the degree of leverage

within the firm.
Another basic measure of leverage, consistent with
L-j, is the ratio of D to total capital (V) where V =D+ S:
D =
D
^2 - T ”
m r ?
This measure, unlike L^, will always satisfy the condition:
0 < Lg < 1.

As a result it is often preferred for reasons

of ease of handling.

The relationship between these two

equations would be:
I'l
h
Although

= TTT7

and Lg are used by many financial writers

in many situations they are very basic and fail to include
many variables and events associated with the degree of
leverage.

For this reason numerous other equations for

measuring leverage have been suggested and studied in an
attempt to develop one more suitable for real world situa
tions.
Pearson Hunt has addressed himself to a portion
of this problem by recognizing that there are two dif
ferent, yet often confused, aspects of leverage.^

One,

Pearson Hunt, **A Proposal for Precise Definitions
of ’Trading on the Equity* and ’Leverage*,” The Journal of
Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 3, (September, 1961), pp. 3^7-386.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

termed trading on the equity by Hunt, concerns itself
with the optimum capital structure of a firm through proper
analysis of financial risk.^

The remaining, called lever

age, deals with the effects of fixed charge securities on
the earnings of a firm under conditions of a constant
capitalization rate.

According to Hunt these are really

different aspects of the same thing, financial risk,
resulting from different viewpoints of the measurer.
Trading on the equity is that seen by the financial maz$ger
as he attempts to determine the correct or optimum pro
portions of debt and equity in his firm's capital structure
and leverage, as defined above, is that viewed by the
investment analyst as he tries to determine the resulting
earnings produced from the capital structure of a firm
that has already been decided upon.

Hunt's equations for

each view are as follows:
Trading on the equity =
(balance sheet leveragje)

■

(as seen by
the fin. manager)

lev.) '
Where:

EBIT =
D =
8 8
K^xc

m ?

^ y e t )

eeimings before interest and taxes
debt capital
cxmaan stock outstanding
cost of debt capital

Briefly financial risk is the risk caused by the
presence of fixed charges resulting from the use of debt in
a firm's capital structure. It is discussed in more detail
on page 30

.
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In a later article commenting on Hunt’s efforts,
Harold Dilbeck states his general agreement but offers
several criticisms and modifications.^

He finds fault

in Hunt’s measure of trading on the equity in that it
attempts to measure the effect of trading on the equity
rather than the act being defined.

As a result he feels

that trading on the equity should be measured by the pro
portion of specified charge securities in a firm’s capital
structure since it is defined in this manner.

Dilbeck

also criticizes Hunt for not giving a complete analysis
of the effects of changes in the cost of debt and equity,
both held constant in the latter’s trading on the equity
measure.

Finally he charges Hunt with the failure of

stating the assumption that tax effects will only cancel
out of the leverage ratio idien marginal and average tax
rates are equal; an assumption that must be present for
his analysis to be complete.
In reply to Dilbeck’s first criticism Hunt says,
I cannot accept Dilbeck’s suggestion that trading on
equity be measured solely by the "proportion of
specific charge securities in a firm’s capital struc
ture" . . . debt ratios . . . are inadequate measures
of the consequences of using fixed-charge securities,
since the quantity of the fixed charges do not enter
into the definition.
Harold Dilbeck, "A Proposal for Precise Definitions
of ’Trading on the Equity’ and ’Leverage’: Comment," The
Journal of Finance. Vol. XVII, No. 1, (March, 1962), pp. 1272
Hunt, op. cit.. p. 131.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

Regarding hia constant cost of debt and equity Hunt explained
that his model was a simple one smd, even though not per
fectly correct theoretically, it was so in regard to his
conclusions.

He did, however, recognize his error in not

stating the assumption equating marginal with average
tax rate but at the same time declared that, "In actual
practice, I believe, it would be very rare for the marginal
tax rate to change significantly from the average."^

Never

theless Dilbeck*s criticisms have generally been accepted
as valid and Hunt's measures have not acquired widespread
approval.

Still, this discussion has served to demonstrate

that a leverage definition as well as the resulting measure
ment is often determined in part by the user and his purpose
of measuring leverage.
Another writer differentiating between aspects of
leverage is Woods idio makes a distinction between capital
gearing and leverage.

"Gearing is a prerequisite for, and

in most cases actually results in, leverage; but a geared
2
firm mig^t still experience no leverage at all."
Basically
this situation can occur due to the definitions given for
capital gearing and leverage.

For leverage to be present

Woods states two requirements:
^Ibid.. p. 132.
2
Ivan R. Woods, "Financial 'Leverage* and 'Gearing*
in Perspective," The South African Journal of Economics.
Vol. 32 , (March, 1964), p. 28.
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(1)

Â source of funds on which there is a fixed or

limited charge paid for use.
(2)

The borrower must earn a return on total

capital not equal to the fixed charges on borrowed funds.
Capital gearing is in reality (1) above, simply the
use of fixed charge ftands in the financial structure, and
therefore if the return on total capital equals the return
required on borrowed funds gearing is present but leverage
is not.
There are two measures of capital gearing recognized
by Woods:

(2)
' '

fiinnual amount payable in preferred charges
expected annual distributable profit

He goes on to show in an example, however, that neither
is fully adequate in relation to leverage (i.e., the first
can show identical gearing between two firms when they
experience different leverage and the second can have the
highest leveraged firm obtaining the lowest degree of
gearing).
Next Woods compared five measures of leverage in
regard to how well they were able to determine the degree
of leverage in three hypothetical firms.

The five measures

were:
(1)

The ratio of net rate of return on equity

capital to rate of return (before interest, after tax) on
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total capital;
1, _________
netequityeamiags/equity
1
earnings before interest after tax/total capital
(2)

The ratio of the net rate of return on equity

capital to rate of return (before interest after deducting
tax of 1-T) on total capital giving the rate of return on
equity as if all capital were equity capital:
- r _____________ net equity eaminga/equity__________
2
(earnings 'before interest ft taxHi-lrj/toial cap.
= Ig where a firm has prior charge capital consisting of
preference shares only.
(3)

To determine the effects on equity earnings

if total capital were increased by the issuance of more
prior charge capital, use the ratio of the rate of return
on new equity to the rate of return on old equity:
r
3

= new equity eamings/equity
old equity eamings/equity
(4)

Ratio of the proportionate change in net equity

earnings to the proportionate change in earnings before
interest and after tax:
change in net equity earnings caused by change
in earnings before interest after tax_____

h = change
.

«gyjy

, ,, ,

in earnings before interest after taxes
earnings before interest after taxes

Since change in net equity earnings caused by change in
earnings before interest after tax equals change in earnings
before interest and after tax,
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T - eamiruM before interest after tax
"4 “
net equity earnings
.
(5)

Ratio of the proportionate change in earnings

after interest before tax to the proportionate change in
earnings before both interest and tax;

r

change in earnings after interest before tax caused
by change in earninfce before interest & tax
_
eainings after Interest before ttdT"
change in eamlnge before interest & taxes
earnings before interest and tax

Since the change in earnings after interest and before tax,
caused by the change in earnings before interest and tax,
equals the change in earnings before interest and tax if
the tax rate is proportional,
T _ esumings before interest and taxes
5“ earning after interest before tax.
If the tax rate changes with income this simplification
will only hold if there is no preference capital.
Woods in deciding upon the most effective measure
of leverage made a distinction similar to that of Hunt.
That is Ig and

would be favored by the mamagement of a

firm since they measure the effect of changes in the capital
structure upon the rate of return on equity capital.

On

the other hand, an investor or financial analyst would
prefer L^,

or

in that the capital structure is fixed.

Thus according to both Hunt and Woods the appropriate
leverage measure is decided in part by the viewpoint of
its user.
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Each of the five measures provided the same ranking
of firms according to leverage for the three hypothetical
firms with the exception of L5 concerned mainly with the
effects of new equity eeimings rather than"normal leverage".
Therefore as far as ranking of firms according to degree of
leverage, measures

, Ig,

and

would serve equally

well.
"Factors which affect the degree of leverage include
debt-equity ratios, net earnings for capitalization, interest
charges and allowable deductions for tax purposes."^

Walters

manages to get all of these variables into his measure of
leverage represented by the equation:
L = 1 + equity

f ^ - (i - tax rate) (debt chsurges) \

aêst— ^—

Where e. =

e^

)

pro rata share of net earnings before
interest assignable to the debt
component of the capital structure

Using this measure the tax rate can or cannot have a large
influence upon L, depending upon e^.

If the share of

eeumings available to the debt component is a great deal
larger than debt charges the tax rate will have little
effect.
In the case of measuring the effect of new financing
James E. Walter, "The Use of Borrowed Funds,"
The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXVIII, Wo. 2, (April, 1955),
pp. l4o.
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on 1 the equation becomes;
1 = 1 + (1 - tax rate) (e^ e
where e

= net earnings available for equity
prior to new financing
ep = additional charges before interest
and taxes after new financing
IL = additional interest charges with new
2
financing

Walter ends by making a distinction between the
measurement of leverage and that leverage which is correct
for an individual firm.

Even t h o u ^ the equations may give

an accurate measure of L, "Whether the degree of leverage (L)
exhibited by a given company is reasonable or unreasonable
is, within wide limits, largely a matter of individual
judgement."^

Or in other words the degree of leverage

will be determined by a management decision deciding upon
the desired trade-off between risk and profit.
(1)

Stock or balance sheet, (2) flow or income,

and (3) conjoint or rate of return are three categories
into which (Eiandhi classifies all measures of leverage.

2

These three categories encompass most of the previous measure
ments presented by Hunt, Woods and Walter.
The first class, including measures based on both
^Ibid.. p. 145.
^J. E. S. Ghandhi, "On the Measurement of Leverage,"
The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXI, No. 4, (December, 1966),
pp. 715-726:=-------
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book and market values, acquires its figures either directly
from the balance sheet or from recorded values determined
in the market place.

Measures in this category are character*

ized by a fixed capital structure and consist mainly of
simple debt to equity ratios.
Flow or income measures, making up the second class,
recognize the fact that debt leverage imposes prior claims
on income and strive to measure the ability of a firm's
income flow to meet these obligations.

Thus the typical

measure is the ratio of debt charges (bond interest, pre
ferred dividends, etc.) to the total income or excepted
income before such charges or taxes are subtracted.

Hunt's

leverage measure, as well as Dilbeck's modifications of it,
are in this category.
The third group, which would include Walter's
measures and most of Woods' encompasses aü.1 conjoint or
rate of return measures.

Measurements of this type con

sist mainly of the ratio of rate of return on equity
(income - debt charges/equity capital) to rate of return
on total capitalization (income/equity capital plus all
debt capital).

By considering different implications caused

by tax laws several variations of this theme are possible.
Ghandhi narrowed down from 13 to 9 the number of
leverage measures used in his test by eliminating those
that by their very nature would provide consistent results
with another measure already represented.

Following this
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the nine separate leverage measurements were used to deter
mine the degree of leverage in two actual industries; (1)
light engineering, machine tools, etc. (fairly stable) and
(2) beers, wines, etc. (complex and unstable).

By performing

a Spearman's coeficients of rank correlation test among the
results of each measure within the two industry groups
Ghandhi found a significeuit correlation between nearly all
measured results in both cases, although those correlations
for the stable industry were somewhat higher.

Prom these

results it is concluded,
. . . that in most "normal" cases there is a suf
ficient degree of stability in the critical variables
so as not to cause substantial and significant incon
sistencies among the various measures of leverage . . .
Thus in practice in circumstances other than the most
extreme it would appear to be a matter of relative
indifference which measure were adopted. '
Even if this conclusion can be accepted the measure
ment of leverage is far from being home free.

The reason

for this is the many variations of figures available to plug
into leverage equations and the lack of any real agreement
upon which one is the most appropriate.

Several of these

decisions areas follow:
(1)

One of them is in relation to what values are

to be used to represent debt and equity.

Such elements

can be portrayed by book value, market value or flow value.
h b i d .. pp. 724-725.
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Book value figures come r i ^ t out of accounting
reports and resultingly are subject to the effects of
various accounting methods such as the practice of conser
vatism which may result in valuations much different from
what many would feel is the real worth.

On the other hand

book values are objective and most likely to be used by
practical men.^
Market values are just what the name implies and
are obtained from the public's opinion, via market
activities, of elements related to the firm.

Usually,

due to variations, these figures are represented by a
calculated average of several values recorded over a certain
time period.

Market values have the advantages of giving

some indication of the future value of elements as seen
through the eyes of the general public and of eliminating
problems of conservative evaluation present with book
value.

Still market values are not always as readily

obtainable as book values and for some figures impossible
Also, as will be recognized in the next chapter, the use
of market value debt-equity ratios may be inappropriate as
a leverage measurement relating to financial risk due to
the possible introduction of a bias.
Flow measures refer to either the cash or income
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 90.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

flows of a firm over a period of time and hence are classi
fied as dyziamic rather than static.

A flow measure of

leverage compares that portion of income or cash flow
relating to debt with that associated with equity.

Such

measures are valuable in that they do not require, as is
the case with book and market values, a rate of interest
in computing the present value of debt or equity.

Plow

measures, however, provide a much better measure of the
ability of a firm to meet fixed debt obligations than they
do of other aspects of leverage.

As a result they are

used for this purpose much more than they are as determiners
of the overall leverage in a firm.
(2)

The classification of preferred stock as debt

rather than equity and its effect on leverage needs some
discussion.

How preferred stock effects leverage is deter

mined by whether or not it is cummulative.

If it is non-

cummulative and dividends are not issued in year one,
leverage in year two will be increased ceteris paribus
since the debt from preferred in year one has been free.^
Preferred stock can also affect leverage comparisons
between firms because of tax laws.

Preferred dividends

are not tax deductable while ordinary debt interest pay
ments are.

Therefore if two firms have the same expected

^Wood3, "Financial *Leverage* and 'Gearing* in
Perspective," p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

income (X), and total debt (D), consisting of preferred
stock and bonds, their actual leverage may be different.
This will be the case whenever the percentage of pre
ferred stock in D differs from one firm to the next.^
For purposes of measuring leverage, preferred stock
can be classified as debt, but if leverage is to be used
as an indicator of financial risk it cannot since ordinary
debt and preferred stock represent different risks in that
one always has to be paid for and the other doesn't under
2
certain conditions.
(3)

■ Another decision area is whether or not to

include short-term loans in the total debt when measuring
leverage; the trend has been not to.

"One of the most

widely used classical definitions of leverage is long-term
debt divided by long-term debt plus stockholders' equity."^
According to Woods many feel that the use of only long-term
debt is adequate since short-term debt often has no interest
charges, fluctuates widely over time and represents such
a small portion of all debt.

He favors inclusion of short

term debt and discards such arguments because they imply
^Ghandhi, "On the Measurement of Leverage," pp. 717*
718.
2
Alexander Barges, The Effect of Capital Stziicture
on the Cost of Capital (Englewood bliffs, kew Jersey:
PrenticeJall, Inc., 1963)7 p. 35.
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 87.
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interest charges are necessary for leverage (actually debt
with no interest or free debt gives greater leverage) and
are only excuses for eliminating problems in the measure
ment of short-term debt.^
Besides these problems there are other less
frequent difficulties which must be faced such as how to
compare leverage between two firms if one leases and the
2
other buys and how to account for possible accelerated
effects on leverage from subsidiaries.^"

For example, what

is the real leverage of firm A who holds shares of levered
firm B who in turn holds shares in . . .
CONCLUSIONS
Due to all of these measurement problems and the
complex and varied situations they attempt to measure,it
is apparent that the art of measuring financial leverage
has not yet satisfied any of the three possible objectives
stated on page 3.

At present it appears that some combin

ation of objectives 1 and 2 will provide the best chances
for obtaining an accurate index of leverage.

That is,

several measures or groups of measures for different puarposes
and a knowledge of their inter-relationships in the form of
^Woods, ’’Financial ’Leverage* and 'Gearing* in
Perspective," p. 35.
^Ibid.. p. 34.
^Ibid.. p. 27.
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advantages and disadvantages of each measure.

Several

measures should be used in conjuntion, especially if there
are unstable or extreme values present, and such measures
should be chosen so as they are not mathematically consistent
with one another by form.

In elementary, uninvolved lever

age situations, however, there is enough correlation between
measures of leverage that almost anyone of them will suffice.
Through this practice and further research and
study, it is hoped that one of the three objectives can be
fully met and the problem of measuring leverage settled.
However, even if some solution is reached to all the problems
of leverage mensuration, there will still be numerous un
settled questions regarding leverage, particuleurly as it
effects financial management.

Some of these are considered

in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
LEVERAGE EFFECTS
Leverage can be charged with having some effect,
either direct or indirect, upon nearly every aspect of
financial management.

This paper will deal only with the

direct effect upon the cost of capital in a static sense.
COST OF CAPITAL
When reading the views of financial theorists,it
seems as if the effects of leverage on a firm's cost of
capital has developed into the crux criticorum of m o d e m
finance.

The reason for this puzzlement and lack of a

positèd theory lies with the yet impossible task of deter
mining the interrelationships of many both objective and
subjective and significant and picayune variables.

Still,

even with these problems, and perhaps because of them,
financial theorists have generally narrowed the problem
down to three major theories describing the effect of
leverage on the cost of capital.
Before studying these theories it is proper to dwell
briefly on the term, cost of capital.

If capital is,

. the total of net worth, plus the long-term sources

21
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funds such as bonds and intermediate-term l o a n s . t h e
cost of capital becomes the sum total of the costs of these
separate sources.

Included would be bonds, preferred

stock, common stock, retained earnings and convertible
securities, all possibly having a different cost and con
tribution to the total cost of capital.

Bach of these

separate components have problems suid controversies of
their own concerning which method gives the best estimate
or measure of their individual cost.

Since it is not the

purpose of this paper, thankfully, to study measurement
problems relating to cost of capital elements,it is only
noted at this time that disagreements and hence possible
inaccuracies do exist.

Therefore, the same can be said

of the total cost of capital figure obtained by combining
these components.
The most common method of arriving at a cost of
capital value when a condition such as this exists is to
calculate a weigpbted-average cost of capital (K^).

Since

this measure and limitations inherent with it are part of
the controversy in regard to leverage's effect on K^, it
will be explained in order that it may be included in a
more meaningful fashion.
The weighted-average cost of capital is simply the
^Gilbert W. Cooke and Edwin C. Boraeli, Business
Financial Management (Boston: Hou/diton Mifflin Oomoanv.
1967), p. B.
-----
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sum of products obtained when the percentage amounts of
each capital component of total capital are multiplied
by their respective costs.

To demonstrate, assume that

a given firm had the following capital structure occurring
in the proportions given and at the coat stated for each
component I
convertible securities
bonds
preferred stock
common stock
retained earnings

# amt.
È0
20
10
30
20

# cost
13.3
6.5
7.5
12.0
15.0

weifgited cost
■. 2.60
1.30
.75
3.60
Eg = T 0 ?

Cost of capital figured for the firm as a weighted^verage
of the five individual capital elements equals 11.25#.
One assumption of this method, limiting its use, is
that future financing occurs according to the same pro
portions of capital components in the capital structure
used to measure cost of capital.

If not, the actual cost

of capital after such financing, unless it is recalculated,
will differ from that measured by the former weighted-aver
age.
The question of book value versus market value
figures is present with the wei^ted-average cost of capital
measure just as it was in the previous chapter with leverage
measures.

The use of both for measuring the cost of capital

will understandably produce unequal results if market values
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differ from book values.
It is known that leverage can directly influence
individual cost of capital components but the real issue,
which as yet has not been proven, is whether or not lever
age influences the weighted-average cost of capital
As recognized by Solombn, there are two ways of
studying the problems of financial structure, dynamic and
static.^

The former concerns itself with efforts to achieve

optimal individual financing decisions throu^out time and
the financial structure existing at any one time is simply
a result of these prior decisions.

The static view, used

in this paper, places the capital structure decision at a
point of time in the drivers seat with the goal of deter
mining the optimal capital structure, given the prevailing
market conditions.

The major decision involved in the

search for this optimum concerns the degree of leverage and
resulting risk and how they relate to the cost of capital.
There is much disagreement, as will be seen shortly, as to
the exact nature of this relationship^and in fact some
interested parties claim that there is no relationship at
all.
The next question that must be answered is why the
^Ezra Sol<mùn, The Theory of Financial Mamgement
(New York; Columbia tMiversity Press,
p. Si7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

leverage-cost of capital controversy is important.

It is

essential because of the role it plays in major fields of
finance such as capital budgeting, dividend policy and
market valuation.
Capital budgeting decisions often depend to a
large extent upon a firm's cost of capital and any factor
which can influence this figure becomes important in the
capital budgeting decision process.

Such a decision, for

example, could be strongly affected by whether one felt
that increased leverage, caused by a new investment financed
by debt, would increase a firm's cost of capital or have
no effect upon it.
Dividend policy is related to the cost of capital
because of its relationship with two major sources of funds,
debt and retained earnings.

By restricting dividends and

using retained earnings for financing, a firm can get by
with a lower degree of leverage.

The question is whether

this lower leverage results in a lower cost of capital
or higher market value than would be the case if dividends
were paid and debt incurred.
The market value of a firm is very closely related
to its cost of capital.

The cheaper it can acquire its

capital the more profits it can accumulate and the higher
should be its market value.
Analysis in this paper, however, will concern itself
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only with the basic relationship between leverage and the
cost of capital and not with how this affects additional
variables.
COST OP EQUITY
During most of the remaining portions of this paper
for the purpose of simplicity the cost of capital will be
thou^t of as the wei^ted-average of only two components,
cost of equity (K^) and cost of debt (K^).

How leverage

effects Kg, which can also be viewed as the rate of return
required by common stockholders on their investments, is
therefore an important factor in the leverage-cost of
capital relationship.
To study this connection the following equation
measuring the cost of equity for a levered firm will be
employed:
V = earnings available to common stockholders
^e
outstanding stock
g
e

, (KBIT - K^ X D)(1 - T) + K^(D)
------------------------------

Using this equation it can be demonstrated how the degree
of leverage, coupled with the earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT), effects the cost of equity or return required
by stockholders.
Considered in the first situation will be a moder
ately leveraged firm having total capital (V) of $100,000
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consisting of $70,000 in conmon stock (3) and $30,000 in
debt (D).

Cost of debt and the tax rate (T) for this and

the following examples in this section will be given as
and 50^ respectively.
taxes is $10,000,
(1 )

K, .

Income before interest and

Substituting into the above equation:

C1P,P°0^ ,,..06 .

Kg = 8,4^
Now by changing the debt-equity ratio to 75?S debt
the effect of higher leverage on Kg will be shown.

To

accomplish this it is assumed that the firm purchases
$45,000 of its own stock on the market and increases its
debt by an equal amount, keeping total capital the same,
(2)

Kg =

(10.000 - ,06 X 75.000) (1-,5) + (,06 x 75.000)
™ 7 5 ,'üüü‘-------^ ^

Kg = 29,095
Due to the increased amount of leverage the stockholders, al
though there are fewer of them, have demanded a larger rate of
return on their investment.

Before the leverage effects on Kg

can be absolutely determined, however, another factor must be
considered.

This is the earnings variable.

To view the

effects of EBIT on Kg the same equation and leverage situa
tions as used just previously will be utilized.

For the first

case the moderate or 3095 debt level is assumed, but EBIT is
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given as $5,000 rather than $10,000.
(3 ) K, = ( ? . ° ° 0 - .06 X

1 , 0 6 x ^ 0 , 0 001

Kg = 4.9^
So in comparison with example (1) with the same debt-equity
ratio, the cost of equity has decreased as EBIT decreased.
To see how a hi^ily leveraged firm is affected
under similar circumstances the debt-equity ratio is changed
to 75% D in the same manner as it was accomplished between
examples (1) and (2), keeping all other variables the same.
(4 ) K, .

(? .° 0 0 - .06 X

(-0 6 x 7^ ,0 00 )

Kg = ^9.0%
Again as leverage increases so does Kg.
The results of these four examples are summarized
in the table below;

low EBIT
($5,000)

high KBIT
($10,000)

low leverage
(V is 309t D)

Kg = 4.9^

Kg = 8 .45c

h i ^ levezage
(V is 75% D)

Kg = 19.0?t

Kg = 29.O5C

Thus as leverage is increased so is cost of equity,
The reason for this is that stockholders demand a h i ^ e r
rate of return on their investment as the financial risk
of the firm is increased.

The EBIT factor also has a
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direct effect upon

as would be expected.

The higher

the earnings the more return stockholders will demand.
Therefore the higher the leverage and EBIT of a firm the
higher will be its cost of equity.
Throu^out this analysis the cost of debt capital
has remained constant for each degree of leverage.
theorists, however, picture

Many

as an increasing function

of leverage and this will be discussed later in conjunction
with the cost of capital theories.
RISK
As mentioned previously, along with additional chances
of gains increased debt leverage also brings additional
chances of losses.
lated.^

This risk can be statistically calcu

To demonstrate, the probability of a loss occurring

for situation (1) in the section just prior can be figured
if the mean and stemdard deviation (r) of expected EBIT are
known.

Assuming they are $10,000 and $3,000 respectively

the following data exists:
EBIT (mean of probability dist.)
r standard deviation
K^ cost of debt
D'^debt
Zp random var. from std. norm. dist.

= $10,000
* $ 3,000
=
= $30,000

Given the following equation:
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 95<
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M)

2p =

-^d ^
—

Zp = (10.000 ; m

^ 30.000)

Zp = 2.73
From a random normal table it is determined that with a 2^
of 2.73 and D amounting to $30,000 the firm has a .003
probability of loss.
Moving on to example (2), however, with D increasing
to $75,000 Sind all other factors remaining constant, the
probability is greatly affected.
7

_ (10.000 - .06 X 75.000)
_
3,boo

Zp = 1.83
Consulting the table once again, the probability of loss
under the increased leverage has jumped to .034, or nearly
twelve times what it was under lower leverage conditions.
It is because of this increase in the chances of suffering
a loss as leverage is increased that most theorists picture
the yield on stockholders' equity as a positive function
of the amount of leverage.
At this point it is appropriate to mention char
acteristics of the types of risk that the employment of
leverage entails.

There are two basic types of risk in

the financial world Miating to leverage, business risk
(BR) involving the basic operational activities of the firm,
and financial risk (PR) having to do with the firm's financing
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decisions.

All firms have some degree of business risk

but all need not have financial risk.

Why?

No firm, no

matter what its business, is absolutely certain of its
future income and without this indubitable degree of
reliability some business risk is present, since it connotes
dispersion in the firm's expected net income.

And since

business risk, is defined as ". . . the relative dispersion
of the net operating income . .

there is business risk

in all firms (i.e., all those not having 100g( certain
incomes is assumed to encompass all firms).

If some case

where such a hig^ level of certainty did exist, there would
ho longer be a problem concerning financing.

"If returns

are completely certain then it is a matter of indifference
2
to stockholders how the fizm is financed."
For purposes of this paper financial risk will be
determined by the degree of leverage ,so conoaivably a firm
with no debt will have no financial risk.

"Financial, risk

is the additional risk to stockholders which strises throu^
the use of borrowed funds for the financing of a project
and is usually measured by leverage."^
V a n H o m e , Financial Management and Policy, p. 18.
O
Stephen J. Tumovsky, "Financial Structure and the
Theory of Production," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXV,
No. 5, (December, 1970), p. 1064.
^Ibid.. p. 1064.
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The justification of this view is presented in the
following discussion differentiating between 3R and PR.
Risk can be measured by the relative distribution of expected
income and in relation to financial risk this income is the
return to shareholders.

The statistical measure for rela

tive distribution is the coefficient of variation (CV) which
is equal to the standard deviation of a distribution divided
by the expected value of the same distribution
Using the CV in an example will demonstrate how business
risk differs from financial risk and how debt leverage
causes finahcial
Por this
ered,

risk.
example three firms X, Y and Z are consid

all having expected net income earnings on assets

equalto $10,000 with a standard deviation of

$3,000.

These

firms are assumed to be identical in all aspects except for
the degree of debt; X having 0, Y having $3,000 and Z $7,000.
Since business risk is the relative distribution of
income which is measured by the CV, it cem be represented
by the equation
BR = .Çand would equal for firms X, Y and Z;
^VanHome, Pinancial Management and Policy, p. 146,
2
Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the
Cost of Capital, p. 17.
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BB =

= -300C

T h o u ^ the business risk for all three f i m s is
equal, their financial risks are different due to varying
fixed charges on debt which must be subtracted from net
income from assets.

Pinancial risk is measured by the

relative dispersion of income belonging to shareholders.
If debt charges (K^) are fixed at 4^ for all outstanding
debt (D), the equations representing financial risk for
the three firms are as follows.
Firm X -

t - (Kg)(D)
= 10,^6o°- 0
PRjj = .3000
Thus in the case of a debt free firm having no leverage,
PR seems to equal BR.

This, however true, is not the real

case, rather the PR equation above is really a measure of
total risk (BR + PR) and when PR = 0 the total risk of a
firm ceteris paribus will equal business risk.

In fact PR

can be defined as BR plus any additional risk of insolvency
caused by debt charges.
Firm Y -

3.000

“ 10,08'
ü - |VÜ4)ü.00S)
FR

= .3036
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Firm Z -

3.000
= roTTO' - T . S T T r r , w )
FRg = .30386
As expected the financial risk and leverage of a
firm are directly related; as one increases so does the
other.

This relationship between financial risk and

leverage is represented more clearly by Graph 1 on page 35
for two values of <r— and K^.

As can be seen, the slope of

the PR line is determined by

and its height above the

0 axis by

. Also in either case

the FR line represents

the total sum of business and financial risk and is in a
direct linear relationship with leverage measured by debt/
common stock.

The fact that there is this relationship

between financial risk and leverage and none between lever
age and business risk will play an important part in the
next section where leverage and its effects, if any, on
the cost of capital are studied.
It must be noted that it is only in the static sense
that business risk and leverage have no relation.

It is a

well accepted fact that firms having low levels of business
risk can carry financial structures much more leveraged
than can firms associated with higher degrees of business
risk,
, , , the reaction of both borrowers and lenders of
funds to the circumstance of low external risks
[e,g, utilities] brings about an optimum capital
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Graph 1
PR and BR as a Function of Leverage*

PR

r=6.000)

s

I
g
u
o
_ BR

m

^ ■ 6 ,000)

h

3

=3 .000)

«

r=3,000)

D/S
*Calculations in Appendix 2.
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structure which is relatively heavily leveraged . . .
On the other hand, an industrial firm— facing heavier
external risks— is likely to experience a relatively
s h a ^ rise in financial charges if its debt-to-equity
ratio (leverage) exceeds certain proportions . . .
Thus the typiceü. industrial financial structure would
tend to contain a smaller proportion of debt to total
financing than either the utility or the bank.1
PRESENT THEORIES
Theories regarding the effect of leverage on the
cost of capital can generally be classified into three
categories:

(1) net income (NI), (2) net operating income

(NOI), and (3) traditional.

The NI theory has few pro

ponents but the remaining two have strong and persuasive
supporters.

In a sort of capsule description NI and NOI

theories seem to occupy the end locations in a range of
possibilities with the traditional theory situated some
where between, in a somewhat compromising position.
Each of 'these theories will be presented in turn
before dealing with criticisms of each and their differences
and similarities.
NI Theory
The net income approach (named by Durand in 1952
and again in 1967 by Weston as, unfortunately, the theory
of traditional business finance) professes belief in a
^Eli Schwartz, "Theory of Capital Structure," The
Journal of Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 1, (March, 1959), p.
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declining overall cost of capital as leverage is in1 2

creased. *

The crux of this theory is that cost of debt

(K^) and cost of equity (Kg) remain constant throughout
all levels of leverage.

This and the following theories

will be demonstrated by using a numerical example followed
by a graphic representation of the relationship between
leverage and cost of capitaLl.

Leverage will be measured

by a simple debt to equity (D/S) ratio.

Given a firm with

net operating income (NOI) of $1,00C^ outstanding debt (D)
of $4,000 and a K^ of 55^ and Kg equal to lOjC.
NOI
less (K^)(D)
earnings available to stockholders
K
m&rket value of stock
D added
market value of firm

1,000
200
850"
.1 0
tJ,000
4.000
12,b00

Calculating cost of capital by the equation:
^o *" market value
K. = 1.000
»
Igfooo
K, = 8.33î<
David Durand, **The Cost of Debt and S^uity Funds
for Business: Trends and Problems of Measurement,** Con
ference on Research in Business Finance (New York: National
Bureau of Scononic Research, 195%), pp. 215-217, reprinted
in Headings in Canteenorary Financial Management, ed.
Keith B.
j m i l d JB. Fiàdlïéy,~ nTlig6TÏÏ; Scott,
Poresman and Company, 1969), p. 385.
o
Fred J. Weston, **Valuation of the Firm and its
Relation to Financial Management,** (MeKinsey Foundation for
Management Research) printed in Financi^ Beaearoh euad
Management Decisions, ed. Alexander À. kobiciiek, (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 14-15.
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Next in order to view the effect of a change in
leverage asaume that D is increased to $7,0C0 accompanied
by the repurchase of $3,000 worth of outstanding shares
keeping total capital (V) the same as in the previous
example.
NOI
less (K,)(D)
earnings available to stockholders
K
mSrket value of stock
D added
market value of firm

1,000
350
o50
.1 0
6,S0o
7.000
13,500

Calculating K^:
1.000
^o - T T Î W

K q = 7.41*
Thus under NI theory the cost of capital decrease
as the amount of leverage is increased.

A graphic repre

sentation of this theory appears below.
As can be seen

continues to decrease, as lever

age increases, until the point of optimum financial struc
ture is reached where leverage is as high as possible.
The reason for K^'s decline is that

is viewed as less

than Kg and as D/S increases more of the lower priced D
funds are substituted for h i ^ e r priced S funds resulting
in a decreasing

function.

The implications of this theory are that K^ will
continue to decline with leverage on into infinity.

Most

theorists, however, realize this is not possible as stated
by Durand,
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NI Theory
Leverage and Cost of Capital

D/S

. . . such a relationship cannot continue indefinately,
. . . As the debt burden becomes substantial, the bonds
will slip below par, and the stock will cease to be
worth ten times earnings.'
If this should happen, however, the risk as viewed by
investors would be greater and
driving up K^.

and

would increase,

But as noted by VanHome,

. . . the critical assumption for NI theory is that
the firm does not become increasingly more risky in
the minds of investors and creditors as the degree
of leverage is increased.
^Durand, "Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for Business:
Trends and Problems of Measurement," p. 386.
^VanHome, Financial Management and Policy, p. 150.
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This assumption understandably is one that cannot be
generally accepted amd as a result supporters of this view
are nearly nonexistent.
NOI Theory
Moving to the opposite extreme,the next position
viewed will be the net operating income theory.

This

method capitalizes a firm’s net operating income with the
use of an overall capitalization rate or cost of capital
which is stated as constant throughout all levels of
leverage.
If K q is given as 10^, this approach can be demon
strated mathematically using the same example as with the
NI method just prior.

Starting with debt equal to $4,000.

NOI

1,000

K

.10

market value of the firm
less market value of D
market value of stock

10,ÔÔÜ
4.000
5,000

Next figuring for the missing statistic, K^:
K = earnings available to stockholders
outstanding stock
NOI - K^(D)
K . -------5 ^ —
1 .0 0 0

h

=

200

-

—

Kg = 13.3*
To view the effects of increased leverage debt is
increased to $7,000 by retiring the appropriate amount of
S ($3,000) in order to keep total capital constant.
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NOI
mSrket value of the firm
less market value of D
market value of stock

1,000
.10
10,000

7.000
■TÎ005

Calculating K^:
1.000 - 350
= -*37^
K , = 21.7)t
Thus under the NOI method as leverage is increased
increases accordingly and

and

remain constant.

Graphically these results are represented below.

NOI Theory
Leverage and Cost of Capital

iH
:ri

D/s

is able to remain constant since it is assumed any
increase in

is equally offset by the substitution of
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lower priced D for S as a means of financing.
Leading backers of the NOI method are Franco
Modi^iani and Merton H. Miller who expounded their theory
1 P
in 1958 and have vigorously defended it since. *
Since
their presentation is used for target practice and com
parison purposes by most financial theorists writing on
the effects of capital structure on cost of capital, it will
be described in detail.
Modigliani and Miller (hereafter MM) have several
assumptions or restrictions upon which their theory is at
least partically dependent and these mmst be recognized
before discussion of their actual theory begins.

These

assumptions aure:
1.

A free and perfect competitive market exists

exclusive of such things as transfer costs smd irrational
investors.
2.

Althou^ it is recognized that the stream

of profits or inccsae accruing to stockholders extends
Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest
ment." The American Economic Review. Vol. XLVIII. No. 3.
(Juni, 195W) pp.""gri-?97 .---------^For the remainder of this paper any references to
this basic article by Modigliani and Miller will simply
be recognized by the appropriate page(s) in brackets
(e.g., 1 above L261-297J).
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indefinitely into the future, it is assumed,

. that

the mean value of the stream over time, or average profit
per unit of time, is finite and represents a random variable
subject to a (subjective) probability distribution.” [265]
3.

"We shall assume that firms can be divided into

•equivalent return’ classes such that the return on the
shares issued by any firm in emy given class is proportionaO. to (auxd hence perfectly correlated with) the return
on the shares issued by einy other firm in the same class.”
[266]

This means that firms can be separated according to

their business risk, as discussed previously on page 30,
with each member of a specific class having the sauae degree
of business risk.
4.

It is assumed that no tax effects are present.

This assumption is lifted later when tax effects are handled
specifically.
After making the preceding assumptions,MM set forth
three propositions, the first stating that, " . . .

the

market value of any firm is independent of its capital
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return
at the rate pk appropriate to its c l a s s . [268]

Propo

sition I is represented by the equation:
MM define pk as the market rate of capitsLlization
for the expected value of uncertain streams occurring in
the
class or simply the average cost of capital, K .
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Vjç « Dj + Sj = X /K^j (for any firm in class j )
Solving for K .:
T
Y

Thus, ”. . .

the average cost of capital to any firm is

completely independent of its capital structure and is
equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity streeun
of its class."

[268-269]

Firms with the same business risk and expected
income stream (7) will have equal market values and stock
prices in an equilibrium condition.

According to MM, if

the conditions of equilibrium are not present, that is if
the total market value of two or more firms within the same
business risk class differ due to capital structure, a
process

of

arbitragewilloccurto remedy the situation.

In this

process rationalinvestors substitute personal

debt for corporate debt (MM assume cost of borrowing to be
the same for individuals and corporations) as is demon
strated in the following example.

Given two companies,

A and B, characterized by the figures below:
7
D
Ko

iq(D)
earnings on S
K_
S®
V

Co. A
$T750(T
-

Co. B
$T7OT
$4,000

-

$1,000
10JÉ
$10,000
$10,000

$
$

200
800
12?C
$6,667
$10,667
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Since both A and B are in the same business risk class and
have equal expected incomes, their total values (V) should
be equal under conditions of equilibrium.

To bring about

equilibrium ISM predict that an investor in firm B, assumed
to have 1/100 of the outstanding shares, will arbitrage
according to the following procedure:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sell shares in Co. B for $67.
Borrow $40 so that his personal debt-equity ratio
is the same as Co. B*s or 4/6.7.
Invest the $107 in Co. A.
Realizing profits $107 X .10 (A's K_)
= $10.70
®
less interest on $40 at
($2.00)
= $8.70 (profit from A)
less profit he would have realized from B
(.12 X $67) or $8.04
giving a net gain of $.66

This procedure, given the laws of a perfect market, will
gradually drive down the value of Co. B euid increase Co.
A until the two are equal as MM say they should be.
The arbitrage process will also work if the situa
tion between the total values of firms A and B are reversed,
Por example, if A's

giving a V of $11,111 an investor

in stock of A would sell his shares for $111 and use it
to purchase $67 worth of B*s stock and $44 in 55^ bonds.

In

this case the arbitrager would realize a gain of $1.24
($10.24 - $9.00).
This process implies that investors will keep the
V of firms with the same BR equal.

There is a great deal

of faultfinding related to this aspect of MM*s theory which
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will be covered later in the section dealing with criticism.
MM's Proposition II says that,

. . the expected

yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate
capitalization rate pk [K^] for a pure stream in the class,
plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debtto-equity ratio times the spread between pk [K^] and
r [K^]."

[271]

K^j =

Represented by the equation:

+ (K^j -

)

(for any firm in class j )

As demonstrated below Proposition II can be derived
from the combination between Proposition I and the formula
for the expected rate of return on common stock.
Proposition I

= (Koj ) (Vj )
since Vj = Dj +
(a) T. =

+ 3.)

Given the following equation for expected rate of return
on equity:

(assume all equity exists of common stock, S)
K,

=

J

substituting (a) for

in the equation above

simplifying

^Use of this equation is questioned by Barges ; see
"0. 68,
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V/hat this proposition really amounts to is that the
increase in K

as D/S increases is exactly offset by a

decrease in

brought about by the use of lower priced D

funds; lower by
Proposition III will be set forth here but not
referred to again in this paper since it depends upon I
and II and does not deal directly with leverage and the
cost of capital.

This proposition concerning investment

policy says that, ”. . .

the cut-off point for investment

in the firm will in all cases be pk [K^] and will be com
pletely unaffected by the type of security used to finance
the investment.”

[288]

Regarding the behavior of K^, MM go one step further
than is the case with the basic NOI method.
theory has

Normal NOI

constant throu^out all levels of leverage

implying that higher degrees of financial risk do not
command higher interest charges on debt.

MM recognize the

falacy of this argument and grant that

may increase

under high amounts of leverage.
such an increase in
Kg keeping

constant.

They claim, however, that

is equally offset by a decrease in
”If r [K^] increases with lever

age, the yield i [Kg] will still tend to rise as D/S
increases, but at a decreasing rather than a constant rate.
Beyond some h i ^ level of leverage, depending on the exact
form of the interest function, the yield may even start to
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fall.”

[274-275]

The effects of such an increase in

is pictured graphically below.

MH Theory
Extreme leverage and Cost of Capital

d Ts

This prediction by MM concerning the effects of extreme
leverage on

is another portion of their theory under

strong attank from traditionalists and will be dealt with
in a later section.
As presented up to this point the NOI or MM method
has no optimal point in the capital structure, in fact
capital structure is optimal at all points of leverage.
When taxes are introduced MM are forced to revise their
constant

position and accept an optimum capital structure
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since under tax conditions the interest paid on debt is
not taxable.
Using the same figures as in previous examples
4-

-

plus the addition of an after tax capitalization rate (K )
equal to 79^ and a corporate tax rate of 505t the following
models can be constructed.

V
D

L = D/S = .8
—
—
200
8CC
400
400
,200
500
.07
»H757T
4.000

s

4,571

NOI
less % ( D )
taxable income
less T
after tax profit
add back Kj(D)
after tax Income

1 = D/S = 2.7
r fm
'
350
opô
325
325
jjg
675
.07
►
7.000

2,643

Kg = NOI/V

>10.4?t

Thus under the influence of taxes the Kg declines
with increased leverage even under MM theory and in addition
the total value (V) of the firm is increased.

As seen by

MM this decline is linear and would appear graphically as
shown below.
According to MM the value of a leveraged firm under
tax conditions is represented by the following equation:
,
J.

(1 - T ) I
■n'C

t(K ,)(D ) . „
T

^ ™ 1
U

X

Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "Corporate
Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital; A Correction," The
American Economic Review. Vol. LII, No. 3, (June, 1963),
p. 436.
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where:

V-,V„ - value of levered and unlevered
Ï
firm
p - market capitalization rate for Z
net of tauces for an unlevered firm
r - market capitalization rate for a
sure debt stream

Continuing, MM show that
and if
again.

3* Vj +
"...

must equal

+ TD^ at equilibrium

the arbitrage process will operate once

'arbitrage* will make values within any class

a function not only of expected after tax returns, but of
the tax rate and degree of leverage."

1

MM Theory
Taxes, Leverage and Cost of Capital

D/S

llbid.. p. 434.
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Prom the equation at the top of the page preceding,
MM derive an equation for a firm’s after-tsuc cost of capital
or earnings yield (J/V),
X

= p^ - T(p* - r)^

This equation conflicts with the view held by traditionalists
and will be covered later in the section dealing with com parisons.
Viewing the graph on page 50,it is apparent that
due to the effects of income taxes there is now an optimum
capital structure (0), located as far to the right and
at the hipest degree of leverage possible.

Such a view

implies that all firms should employ as much debt as
possible in order to decrease

to its lowest value.

How

then do MM explain the fact that firms in the real world
show no efforts in this direction?

They feel that the

actual firm does not increase debt unlimitedly due to
cheaper means of financing and the need for a safety
margin.
. . . the existence of a tax advantage for debt
finemcing . . . does not necessarily mean that cor
porations should at all times seek to use the maximum
possible amount of debt in their capital structures.
For one thing, other forms of financing, notably
retained earnings, may in some circumstances be
cheaper still «hen the tax status of investors under
the personal income tax is taken into account. More
important, there axe . . . limitations imposed by
^Ibid.. p. 439.
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lenders, as well as many other dimensions (and kinds
of costs) in the real world problems of financial
strategy which are not fully comprehended within the
framework of static equilibrium models, either our
own or those of the traditional variety. These addi
tional considerations • . . will normally imply the
maintenance by the corporatif of a substantial reserve
of untapped borrowing power.'
A major threat involved with increased debt is
that the carrying charges may not be met bringing about
the danger or condition of bankruptcy.

Robichek emd Myers

argue that these factors eliminate the tax advantage for
higher degrees of leverage.
These contingent bankruptcy costs, to the extent that
they exist in fact, constitute a disadvantage partially
or wholly offsetti^ the tax advantage of leverage.
It is our hypothesis that the present value of these
costs will be an increasing function of leverage.2
As a result,
. . . we would expect the market value of the firm
to be an increasing function of leverage for firms
with little or no aebt, but that the values of the
firm ultimately declines if leverage is caxuried too
far.3
They offer proof of this condition consistent with tra
ditional theory even while assuming a perfect arbitrage
process as under MM theory.

^Ibid.. p. 442
2
Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, "Pro
blems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Journal
of Finance amd Quantitative Analysis. (June, 1966), p. 16.
^Ibid.. p. 19
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Traditional Theory
Traditional theory is the name given to the third
major opinion describing the relationship between leverage
and the cost of capital.

At present this approach seems

to have the edge, as numbers of supporters are concerned,
perhaps due to its somewhat compromising position and less
idealistic assumptions.

It is less idealistic specifically

in the sense that traditional theory recognizes that there
may be certain inequalities in the market such as trans
action costs and higher rates of

for individuals than

for large corporations.
Traditional theory separates degrees of leverage
into three ranges, each having a different effect upon K^.
Throu^out the three ranges of leverage

is increasing

at an increasing rate due to investors* growing concern
over financial risk.
traditionalists,

Subject to several variations among
is generally constant through the first

two ranges up until the beginning of range three, termed
the critical degree of leverage.

At this point

begins

to increase at an increasing rate in response to increased
creditors* demands for more returns due to higher financial
risks in the firm.
In the first range of leverage Kg tends to increase
Kg but is more than offset by the substitution of 0 for
S resulting in a decreasing Kg.

During range two Kg
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continues to increase but is equally offset by the sub
stitution of D for 8, now occurring at a slower rate than
in range one, all causing a level
in range three vAiere

and

function.

Finally

are both increasing

is

also forced upward.
To mathematically demonstrate the workings of
traditional theory the following series of examples is
presented.

The first example is a debt free firm char

acterized by the figures below.

■ NOI
less K^(D)
earning available tostockholders
K_
market valueof stock
add D
market value of firm (V)

$ 1,000
$ 1,000
.10
$10,000
$10,000

calculating
Ko ^o =
Ko = 10)t

For the next example it is assumed that the firm
increases its debt from 0 to $4,000 and retires outstanding
stock of an equal amount.
increased leverage

is set at 5f^ and due to the

is now II9Ê.

^For a debt free firm
element making up K .
o’

since

is the only
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NOI
less K.(D)
earnings available

to stockholders

$ 1,000
200
8ÔÔ

K
market value
add D
market value

.11

of stock

$""7727T
$ 4.000
$TT757T

of firm (V)

calculating

Kq = 8.1 6#
As can be seen, by increasing leverage the market value
of the firm has increased and

has decreased.

Moving on to a still higher degree of leverage,
assume that the firm increases its D to $7,000, again
retiring outstanding stock of the same amount.
from the increased financial risk

Resulting

jumps to 14# and

to 6#.
NOI
less K.(D)
earnings available to stockholders
K market value of stock
add D
market value of firm (V)

$ 1,000
420
58Ô
.14
$ 4,l43
$ 7.000
$11,l43

calculating
^0 * t H t o
Eg = 8 .9 7 #
By increasing the leverage once again exactly the
opposite results have occurred from the previous example
following the first increase.
of the firm has decreased and

This time the total value
has increased.

Graphically
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the traditional view is shown below.

Traditional Theory
Leverage and Cost of Capital

D/S

Traditional theory professes that an optimal capital
structure definitely exists.

In the graph above it would

be smywhere in range 2 since

is lowest and constant in

this area.

Some traditional theorists show

bottoming

out at One specific optimal point, in such a case range 2
would consist of this one optimal point.

According to

Solomon the
. . . precise location of the optimal degree of lever
age is the precise point where the rising marginal
cost of borrowing is equal to the average overall cost
of capital. For this purpose the marginal cost of a
unit of debt capital must be measured as the sum of
two things; (a) the increase in total interest payable
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on debt capital when debt is increased from B [D] to
B* [D*]; (b) the amount of extra net earnings required
to restore the value of the equity component to what
it would have been under the pre-existing capitaliza
tion rate K. which prevailed before debt is increased
from B [D] to B*
Just where this optimal point is located, or even where the
boundries to each range are, is dependent to a large extent
upon the degree of risk the particular firm is associated
with and how investors and creditors react to this risk. As
a result there is no clear cut method of arriving at such
values or even proving in the real world that the traditional
method, or any of the other two for that matter, is repre
sentative.

Still real world evidence in relation to an

optimal structure is one argument supporters give in favor
of the traditional approach and will be dealt with more
closely in the section including empirical evidence.
The next two sections will compare and criticize
only the last two theories of leverage and cost of capital
presented.

The reason for this being the general lack of

support by anyone for the NI theory.

As stated previously,

this approach relies on the assumption that risk, as seen
by investors, does not increase in anyway as the degree of
leverage is increased.

Since this assumption is rejected

by nearly all financial writers, disagreements center
around the two remaining theories, the NOI held by MM and
^Bzra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management
(New York: Columbia tbilversiiy kess,
p. §77
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the theory of m o d e m business finance backed by tradition
alists.
COMPARISONS
It would seem that the question of which theory of
capital structure versus cost of capital is correct could
be answered by a look at real world financial practices.
This, however, is not the case since empirical results
of such probes have been interpreted in as many ways as
there are theories and then some.

MM present tests that

favor their position.
The results of these tests [an analysis of the relation
between security yields euid financial structures] are
clearly favorable to our hypothesis . . .
!Bhe data
in short provide no evidence of any tendency for the
cost of capital to fall as the debt ratio increases.
[282-284 ]
In contrast Schwartz and Aronson feel there is some relation
between leverage and the cost of capital since an optimal
financial structure apparently exists in the market place.
Our data . . . represent some surrogative evidence that
in a capital market where sources of funds may be some
what segregated, the various classes of firms have
developed typical financial structures that are optimal
for their operational risks and asset structures.'
Barges, after studying three industries (railroads,
cement companies and department stores) in a test of the
Eli Schwartz and Richard Aronson, "Some Surrogate
Evidence in Support of the Concept of Optimal Financial
Structure," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XZII, No. 1,
(March, 1§67), p. 10.
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MX theory states that
• . • the probability of all tests indicating the same
thing because of chance is extremely small. Thus, on
the basis of evidence presented herein, the hypothesis
of independence between average cost and capital
structure appears untenable.1
T h o u ^ each side seems to prove their own theory
they can't disprove their opponents, **• . . the regression
studies undertaken are simply not precise enough to con2
stitute absolute refutation of the MM position."
"Those
who make sport with regressions have yet to show that the
traditional position . . .

is either proven or contradicted

by the empirical evidence available."

Thus about the only

conclusion available after studying such evidence is no
conclusion at all due to the lack of positive and unre
futable evidence.
When trying to compare the two views, it is helpful
to look at one portion of their differences as recognized
by Barges.

He explains that the traditionalist views debt

costs plus the addition to equity costs caused by debt, as
less than the "real" cost of equity.

Thus the average

cost of capital can decrease as cheap debt is substituted
for expensive equity.

MX, however, feel that the "real"

cost of equity funds equal cost of debt funds plus the
^Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the Cost
of Capital, p. lOTT
^VanHome, Financial Management and Policy, p. 167.
^Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, p. 98.
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addition to equity costs caused by debt (which is really
a debt cost).

Under this view average cost of capital can

not be decreased throu^ the substitution of debt for equity
since the "real" cost of each are the same.^
In presenting the two theories it was noted that
MM believed in no optimal capital structure until tauces
were introduced auad then only to the extent of taoc savings
on interest and the lower risk due to the surity of the
extra after-tax earnings.

Traditional theory supports am

optimal capital structure with or without tax bonuses be
cause of the interaction of risks amd capital costs resulting
in a U-shaped cost of capital function.

Even under tauc

conditions, however, when each theory predicts am optimal
capital structure, the cost of capital as figured by MM
and traditionalists differs.

This difference is reflected

in the after-tauc average cost of capital or earnings yield
for a firm as viewed by each position.

As presented pre

viously on page 51 MM represent the after-tax cost of
capital as:
Y = p^ - T(p^ - r) D
V
V
The effect of income tauces on

is to decrease the cost

of capital of am unlevered firm (p ) by T(p

- r)D/V.

example, given the following data:
^Barges, op. cit.. pp. 4-5.
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V

10*
= 50*
=
6*
= $ 3,000
= $10,000

y

=

=

T
r

D

pt - T(pt - r)^

y = .10 — .5 0 (.1 0 — .0 6 )y ^
y = .098
The cost of capital of an unlevered firm (p*) has been
lowered from 10* to the after-tax average cost of capital
of 9.8* due to the introduction of income tax as figured
via the MM method.
In comparison the traditional theory, according to
MM, views the equation for after-tax cost of capital in
tax situations as;
1

P* - (P* - r)|
Under this equation cost of capital will decrease as a
result of leverage (up to the critical point) whether income
taxes are present or not and any such decrease will be
larger than that figured by the MM method.

For example,

using the same figures as in the previous case, the average
after-tax cost of capital for an unlevered firm (p*) will
^Modigliani-Miller, "Corporate Income Taxes and the
Cost of Capital: A Correction," p. 439.
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fall from lOjC to 8.8#.
y =

- (P^ - r)y

y = .1 0 — ( . 1 0 -.0 6 )^ 1 ^

^ = .088
Thus MM say as an interpretation of their results
that, "The predicted rate of decrease of 7^/V with D/V
...

is still considerably smaller than under the naive

traditional view . . ."^
Since each theory is supported by strong arguments
several writers have tried to accept both by offering
explanations of possible reconciliation between them.

Such

explemations have generally been rejected by strong sup
porters of each theory since they usually include some
tampering with theoretical structures or assumptions.
Robichek and Myers have postulated this sort of
explanation under dynamic conditions.

They claim that

their hypothesises present, " . . . a plausible reconciliation of the MM logic and traditional conclusions."

2

To begin with optimal is defined as that degree of leverage
where the overall value of the firm is highest, rather than
^Ibid.. p. 439.
^Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, Optimal
Financing Decisions (Siglewood Cliffs. New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1965), p. 44.
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that point where overall cost of capital is lowest (these
two points need not be located at the same leverage ratio).
Next Robichek and Myers allow expected income (X) to vary
inversely with the amount of leverage.

This relation,

which is contrary to MM implicati<ms, is caused by the fact
that,

. . stockholders' estimates of

Y [Z]

may decline

because of the possibility of the firm's having to inter
rupt future investments in order to meet interest payments."
By replacing Y with Y

Y

(representing the tendency of

to decrease with an increase in leverage) and using it

in MM'3 own equations, typical traditional results are
obtained.

A graph of this hypothesis is located below.

Robichek'3 ft Myers' Reconciliation
Expected Income ft Leverage

^ Y (taxes)
Y(?J

Y

Y (taxes)

(A)

MM
Robichek ft Myers

1Ibid..

p. 43.
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Thus it is shown that if % is allowed to vary in relation
to leverage both the X and X after taxes will have optimum
positions (0^, Og on graph) much the same as predicted by
traditional theory.

Robichek and Myers are unable to

prove this hypothesis and offer it only as a plausible
explanation until such time when more general dynamic
theories are developed.
Weston, using a different approach, also attempts
to reconcile MM with traditional theory.
. . . in testing Proposition 2, Modigliani and Miller
define leverage as the ratio of debt to debt-plus-stock.
I have found that, by taking the regression equations
obtained by Modigliani and Miller for Proposition 2
and changing the measure of leverage from debt to stock
to debt-plus-stock, the regression relation becomes
curved upward as su^^sted by traditional theory.
Thus, Proposition 2 of Modigliani and Miller reinforces
traditional theory rather than controverts it.1
In other words MM's yield relation will change from a
straight line function to a curved function as shown in
graphs 1 and 2 below as D/V is substituted for D/S as a
measure of leverage.
Barges disagrees with Weston's analysis by
stating that
The . . . conclusion by Professor Weston was apparently
reached by him in an attempt to develop some kind of
reconciliation between the MM and the traditional
views. However, . . . it is the opinion of this
writer that there is no basis for reconciling the two
V . Pred Weston, "The Management of Corporate Capital;
A Review Article," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXXIV,
No. 2, (April, 1961), p.' i'35'.
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views. The two views are very much opposed: the one
says that debt is cheap and the other says that it is
not.'

Graph 1

Graph 2

D/V

Another manner in which some writers try to recon
cile the two diverse views is by creating two worlds for
the theories to rule separately.

Under this design King

MH rules in the theoretical world and King Traditional
reigns in the real world of imperfections.
Perhaps in fact such a reconciliation between
existing theories, or the emergence of some new theory
or additional proof for an old one my someday unify writers
behind a single explanation of the relationship between
capital structure amd the cost of capital.

A propitiation

of theory at present, however, seems a long way off as
is made readily apparent in the next section summarizing
criticisms of existing theories.
1,

Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the
Cost of Capital, pp. 13-H.
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CRITICISMS
Once there was a powerful king who ruled his world
all alone until one day he was criticized and attacked by
a new ideology which gained some support in his kingdom
and strived for it all.

The king, however, had many loyal

followers of his own who fought back throu^ numerous
criticisms of their own directed toward the new ideology
which was now forced onto the defensive.
This appears to be an accurate analogy of the pre
sent situation between MM theory and "King Traditional."
The latter has many supporters with a great deal of criti
cism and as a result the former has mainly defended his
original theory.

Therefore, this section will consist

mostly of criticism against MM theory.
Weston criticizes MK by charging them with the
failure of taking into account the effects of growth in
earnings per share.

MM theory applies only to non-growth

firms in the static sense.

Based on regression analysis

studies of data from the electric utility industry, Weston
concludes that equity yields are negatively related to both
leverage and growth in earnings per share.

Therefore, as

leverage increases growth decreases, causing a corresponding
increase in equity yield which is interpreted by MM as
being a positive function of leverage.
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When the influence of growth is isolated, the net
influence of leverage on the cost of capital is found
to be consistent with traditional business finance
theory rather than the Modigliani and Miller propo
sitions.'
This of course is a dynamic type of test of a static
theory.

Although Robichek and Myers obtain results consis

tent with traditional theory also, they disagree with
Weston's growth analysis.
. . . no restrictions concerning possible growth
patterns in operating income or assumptions about
whether or not investors agree in their estimates of
the future performance of firms are necessary to prove
Proposition 1.2
Alexander Barges completed a full study of MM
theory inclusive of empirical, theoretical, and procedural
evaluations.
(1)

The major criticisms that he found are:
By using, as MM do, market valued debt-equity

ratios as a measure of financial risk, many variations in
a heterogeneous sample will not be cancelled out as they
would if book valued debt-equity ratios were employed.
This situation will be further agitated if there is a
lack of observations in the sample having little or no
debt.
(2)

MM's arbitrage process and their Proposition I

J. Pred Weston, "A Test of Cost of Capital Propo
sitions,” The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 2,
(October, 1963), p. ilè.
^Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, "Prob
lems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure,” Journ^
of Finance and Quantitative Analysis. (June, 1963), p. 13*
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are in fact dependent upon certain assumptions relating
to investor risk, in spite of their statements to the
contrary.

In addition MM have ignored induced reactions

which may even cause their arbitrage process to work in
reverse.
(3)

In defining expected rate of return on common

stock in order to derive Proposition II from Proposition I
(page 46) MM were inconsistent in that they subtracted
current interest (definite known value) from expected future
profits (unknown value).

For theoretical purposes they

should have used some expected average future interest
charges consistent with X rather than the current know
charges, E^(D).
(4)

MM's Proposition II assumes that the shapes

of investor probability distributions are not skewed.
Barges feels they may be due to the limited liability
feature of many shares of common stock.^
Bodenhom is critical of MM's handling of risk.
Modigliani and Miller assume that the total amount
of risk associated with the net operating income is
independent of the financing, since risk is a function
only of the variability of the earnings stream and this
variability is unaffected by financial structure.
Financial writers, however, frequently use the ratio
of debt charges to net operating income as a measure
of risk, because they are interested in the probability
^Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the
Cost of Capital.
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that the net income will be negative and that the
firm cannot meet its fixed charges. 1
In other words just because the variability of earnings
risk is not dependent upon capital structure does not mean
that total risk is independent because total risk may include
risks in addition to the variability of earnings risks.
Another writer who has generated extensive criticism
of the MM theory is David Durand, who's main denouncements
are as follows:
(1)

MM state that no additional risk is incurred by

individual investors vrtien they engage in the eurbitrage
process, but this is not the case due to the limited liabil
ity a creditor in a corporation enjoys in relation to the
unlimited liability of an individual engaged in marginal
purchases.
(2)

The establishment of separate classes of firms

according to business risk, as determined in a static sense,
is not adaptable to the dynamic economy in the real world
where stocks do not sell at book value.
(3)

Realistically the arbitrage process of corpora

tions and individuals is subject to many restrictions in the
2
everyday market place.
Diran Bodenhom, "On the Problem of Capital Budget
ing," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 4, (Dec., 1959),
p. 485
^William J. Baumol and Burton G. Malkiel, "Ü3ie Firm's
Optimal Debt-Equity Combination and the Cost of Capital," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. LXXXI. No. 4. (November.
T9 6 7 ), p p:

-------------
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The effect of one of these limitations, trans
action costs, is studied by Baumol and Malkiel.

They argue

that a levered firm may have a h i ^ e r value than an unlevered
firm in the same risk class simply due to the effect of
these costs.

This results since an individual investor

must, if he wishes to take part in the MM arbitrage process,
incur transaction costs.

For example, if an individual

investor holds shares in a firm which provides him with more
than the desired degree of leverage he will sell them and
purchase shares in a less levered firm.

If the value of

the first firm were equal to the second, transaction costs
would stop the process and therefore the unlevered firm
must be valued lower than the levered firm.^
Solomon, as well as criticizing MM for many of the
issues already listed, opposes MM's explanation of the
behavior of

under conditions of extreme leverage.

As

was described earlier MH state that Kg, under h i ^ leverage,
will begin to increase at a decreasing rate and actually
decrease if necessary in order to keep

constant.

Such

a situation according to Solomon is both inconsistent with
MM's own assumptions and with the actions of normal, rational
2
investors.
William J. Baumol and Burton G. Malkiel, "The
Firm's Optimal DebtrBquity Combination and the Cost of
Capital." The Quarterly Journal of Econwnics, Vol. IiXXXI.
No. 4, IvoV ^ l r r ^ m ; p ^ 547-578.------2Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, pp.
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Eli Schwartz differs with MM in that he feels there
is a definite optimum capital structure for any amount of
equity.

Given some fixed amount of ownership capital,

equal absolute amounts of debt will result in lower debtequity ratios for firms with the largest amount of equity.
For example;
Co. A
(S =1.000)
add
add
The addition of

D = 200
D = 400

D/S = 1/5
D/S = 2/5

debt of equal

Co. B
(S =2.000)
D/S = 1/10
D/S = 1/5

amounts resultsin a lower

d/ s

for

firm B, with the largest amount of S, than for firm

A.

Since a lower debt-equity ratio signifies a lower

interest rate, the debt can be secured cheaper by a firm
with S = $2,000 than one with S = $1,000.

Thus, tùr each

level of S and D there exists an earnings amount and this
amount can be optimized by arriving at the correct amount
of S.^
In contrast to these criticisms a recent article
by Stiglitz is, for the most part, consistent with MM
theory but in a more general sense.

Stiglitz first high

lights the assumptions or limitations under which the
original MM theory operates.

Next he is able to eliminate

many of them by formulating a generalized MM theorm whose
validity, ”, . . does not depend on the existence of risk
^Schwartz, "Theory of the Capital Structure of the
Firm," pp. 18-39.
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classes, on the competitiveness of the capital market, or
on the agreement of individmls about the probability
distribution of outcomes,"^

Two assumptions that Stiglitz

does make are (1) that individuals and firms can borrow
at the same market rate of interest, and that (2) no firms
go bankrupt.

In later portions of the article, however,

he does show that MM results may be valid even with certain
limitations on individual borrowing and under certain
specific conditions where the probability of bankruptcy
is finite.
In disagreeing with the traditional stance, Stiglitz
states that
If there are three or more firms in the same risk
class, and the firms with the highest and lowest
debt-equity ratios have the same value, then the
value of all other firms must be the same. . , .
This result rules out the possibility of a U-shaped
curve relating to the value of the firm to the debtequity ratig.Z
Even if this statement is correct, however, it does not
mean that it is representative of the actual market place.
CONCLUSIONS
The majority of criticism against MM has taken
place outside of the arena fenced in by their assumptions
Voseph E. Stiglitz, "A Re-Examinât ion of the
Modigliauii-Miller Theorm,” The American Economic Review,
Vol. LIX, No. 5, (Dec ember, 15'5'9T,“ p". "IW.
^Ibid.. p. 788.
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and in most cases this outer area has been the realistic
and imperfect world not dependent upon theoretical fences.
There are two possible ways of looking at this situation.
One is that both opponents eure correct and in fact
not even opponents in the sense of facing each other since
they are standing on two different battlefields, "Realistic
Ridge" and the "Little-Big Theory."

Under this view the

rule exists that one side cannot be attacked on the other's
battlefield.
The other view holds that, neither a real battle
nor a real Winner is possible until the fences can be
broken down and all the invading variables correctly
related to theory.

Theory per se is not advantageous un

less it can be utilized within the everyday world to solve
problems; it must be representative suid capable of useful
predictions and applications.
If the objective is progress there is no question
but that the latter view is superior.

Under this framework

MM theory must be criticized and tested in the real world
if it is to be of any use to the manager of Joe's DriveIn, who cannot always conform his environment to MM
assumptions.
Research into the leverage cost of capital dispute
has in general been of this preferred type but more is
necessary since a dispute still exists.
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Appendix 1
LISTING OP LEVERAGE MEASURES

1.

L = ^ (book value)

2.

L = g- (market value)

3.

L = y y -g (book value)

4.

L = ^

g (market value)
K,

5.

L = m

6.

J _

7.

L =

8.

L

g
y

measure ]
(flow measure)

p/annuity factor for X years_____
cask flow - annuity factor for ± years
+ yearly principle repaid
total cash flow

income before

10.

S
L = 1 + ÏÏ
0

11.

L = 1 +

12.

L = 1 +

13.

L
^ =

-%)

x (82 - ^1)
e
xe„ - f 1

net equity eaminiçs/S
m
after T / f ‘
78
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H15.

^= %
L = asî-S2H||j,|^piafiaâ

16.
L =

change in net equity eaminge caused by change
in earnings before interest after tax
net equity earxmuca
______
c^:iange in earnings before inteMSt after taxes
earnings W f ore interest after taxes

17.

L =change in earnings after interest before
tax caused
by change in earnings before interest & tax
earnings after intersat before t ^
_____
change in eaûrnings before interest & taxes
earnings before interest and tax

18.

I= aebt + prefgred stock (^ook value)

19.

L = debt + preferred stock (market value)
equity

20-

^ = debi

21.

^ = debt

22.

L

-lue)
^alue)

total interest + dividends on preferred
-------:--------- S5T?--------- ^-------+ div. on pref.

^ ~ EbiT - (K, + div. on pref.)
+ div. on pref.
^
25.

div
(EBIT -Ka - —

) C1^)

L - div. on pref.
EBIT “

- div. on pref. y
EBIT
equity
/ equity + b + preferred
/
stock
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?7.

/
L = lEBIT —

div. on pref A
^
J
ëquiVy------

/ S3I1?(1-T)
/equity + debt +
/ preferred stock
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